OAI/Computability/UniqueGames/Decoding/PrivateStrategyLemmas.lean

GitHub source file

29 declarations, 0 contain sorry, 0 declared as axioms

Actual private response laws for Fourier decoding

The right response law has only its row-fiber table, the inclusion of its hidden kernel, a first-bit map, and an actual fallback answer as arguments. In particular it has no column slice or witness. Zero-mass invalid frequencies are repaired to the fallback so that the response type always consists of actual answers. Witness data occur only in the success analysis.

  1. def OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.candidates line 36
  2. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.mem_candidates line 39
  3. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.candidates_nonempty line 42
  4. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.candidates_card_le line 46
  5. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.candidates_card_le_pow line 58
  6. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.candidate_preimage line 72

    Source documentation

    First-bit preservation converts a projected coset member into an actual answer in the left candidate set.

    theorem candidate_preimage (Z : Submodule F2 E) (z : E)
        (π : E →ₗ[F2] E') (τ : E →ₗ[F2] F2) (τ' : E' →ₗ[F2] F2)
        (hτ : τ'.comp π = τ) (y : E') (hy : y - π z ∈ Z.map π)
        (hybit : τ' y = 1) : ∃ v ∈ candidates Z z τ, π v = y := by
    …

    Mentions: OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.candidates

  7. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.exists_unit line 96
  8. def OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.chooseUnit line 106
  9. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.chooseUnit_spec line 110
  10. abbrev OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.ActualAnswer line 113
  11. def OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.privateSeedLaw line 116

    Source documentation

    The uniform output character followed by its actual Fourier frequency.

    def privateSeedLaw (F : (E →ₗ[F2] H) → K) :
        FiniteDistribution ((K →ₗ[F2] F2) × (H →ₗ[F2] E)) where
    …
  12. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.privateSeedLaw_expectation line 126
  13. def OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.privateOutput line 137

    Source documentation

    The decoder receives no left witness. The first-bit repair affects only zero-mass frequencies when the table is folded.

    def privateOutput (ι : H →ₗ[F2] K) (τ : E →ₗ[F2] F2)
        (fallback : ActualAnswer τ) (p : (K →ₗ[F2] F2) × (H →ₗ[F2] E)) :
        ActualAnswer τ :=
    …

    Mentions: OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.ActualAnswer

  14. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.privateOutput_eq_contraction line 145
  15. def OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.privateLaw line 160

    Source documentation

    This is an actual finite distribution on actual answers, for every visible row table. The sampler's normalization is Parseval, not a hypothesis.

    def privateLaw [Fintype E] (F : (E →ₗ[F2] H) → K)
        (ι : H →ₗ[F2] K) (τ : E →ₗ[F2] F2) (fallback : ActualAnswer τ) :
        FiniteDistribution (ActualAnswer τ) :=
    …

    Mentions: OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.ActualAnswer

  16. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.privateLaw_expectation line 165
  17. def OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.candidateLaw line 180

    Source documentation

    The left rule is uniform on its own chosen affine-answer candidates.

    def candidateLaw (Z : Submodule F2 E) (z : E) (τ : E →ₗ[F2] F2)
        (hz : τ z = 1) : FiniteDistribution (ActualAnswer τ) := by
    …

    Mentions: OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.ActualAnswer

  18. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.candidateLaw_expectation line 187
  19. def OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.conditionalAgreement line 212

    Source documentation

    Actual independent response-law success, with the literal projection test.

    def conditionalAgreement (Z : Submodule F2 U) (z : U)
        (τU : U →ₗ[F2] F2) (hz : τU z = 1) (π : U →ₗ[F2] E)
        (F : (E →ₗ[F2] H) → K) (ι : H →ₗ[F2] K)
        (τ : E →ₗ[F2] F2) (fallback : ActualAnswer τ) : ℝ :=
    …

    Mentions: OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.ActualAnswer

  20. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.conditionalAgreement_eq_sum line 219
  21. def OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.goodCosetMass line 249

    Source documentation

    The exact good Fourier mass in a witness coset; unlike the response law, this analysis-only quantity is allowed to mention the witness.

    def goodCosetMass (Q : Submodule F2 E) (z' : E)
        (F : (E →ₗ[F2] H) → K) (ι : H →ₗ[F2] K) : ℝ :=
    …
  22. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.goodCosetMass_nonneg line 256
  23. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.good_frequency_preimage line 268

    Source documentation

    A good sampled frequency has a valid left preimage. Neither decoder is given the proof or the witness used here.

    theorem good_frequency_preimage (Z : Submodule F2 U) (z : U)
        (τU : U →ₗ[F2] F2) (π : U →ₗ[F2] E)
        (F : (E →ₗ[F2] H) → K) (ι : H →ₗ[F2] K)
        (τ : E →ₗ[F2] F2) (fallback : ActualAnswer τ)
        (hτ : τ.comp π = τU)
        (folded : ∀ N h, F (N + τ.smulRight h) = F N + ι h)
        (σ : K →ₗ[F2] F2) (Φ : H →ₗ[F2] E)
        (hn : σ.comp ι ≠ 0)
        (hc : Φ ∈ frequencyCoset (Z.map π).mkQ ((σ.comp ι).smulRight (π z)))
        (hp : 0 < frequencyWeight (tableSign F σ) Φ) :
        ∃ v ∈ candidates Z z τU, π v = (privateOutput ι τ fallback (σ, Φ)).1 := by
    …

    Mentions: OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.ActualAnswer, OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.candidates, OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.privateOutput

  24. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.conditionalAgreement_ge_mass_div_card line 289

    Source documentation

    The actual independent policies agree with at least the good Fourier mass divided by the number of left candidates.

    theorem conditionalAgreement_ge_mass_div_card (Z : Submodule F2 U) (z : U)
        (τU : U →ₗ[F2] F2) (hz : τU z = 1) (π : U →ₗ[F2] E)
        (F : (E →ₗ[F2] H) → K) (ι : H →ₗ[F2] K)
        (τ : E →ₗ[F2] F2) (fallback : ActualAnswer τ)
        (hτ : τ.comp π = τU)
        (folded : ∀ N h, F (N + τ.smulRight h) = F N + ι h) :
        goodCosetMass (Z.map π) (π z) F ι / (candidates Z z τU).card ≤
          conditionalAgreement Z z τU hz π F ι τ fallback := by
    …

    Mentions: OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.ActualAnswer, OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.goodCosetMass, OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.candidates, OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.conditionalAgreement

  25. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.goodCosetMass_lower_from_slice line 327

    Source documentation

    The actual transferred affine-slice agreement supplies the sampled good Fourier mass, including removal of characters trivial on the hidden kernel.

    theorem goodCosetMass_lower_from_slice (Q : Submodule F2 E)
        [Fintype (H →ₗ[F2] Q)] [Fintype ((E ⧸ Q) →ₗ[F2] H)]
        (N₀ : E →ₗ[F2] H) (F : (E →ₗ[F2] H) → K)
        (ι : H →ₗ[F2] K) (hι : Function.Injective ι) (z' : E) (b : K)
        (α : ℝ) (hα : 0 ≤ α) (ℓ r : ℕ)
        (hH : Module.finrank F2 H ≤ ℓ) (hQ : Module.finrank F2 Q ≤ r)
        (hsmall : 1 / (Fintype.card H : ℝ) ≤ α / 8)
        (hagreement : α / 4 ≤ 𝔼 A : (E ⧸ Q) →ₗ[F2] H,
          if F (N₀ + A.comp Q.mkQ) = b + ι ((N₀ + A.comp Q.mkQ) z')
          then (1 : ℝ) else 0) :
        (α / 8) ^ 2 / (2 : ℝ) ^ (ℓ * r) ≤ goodCosetMass Q z' F ι := by
    …

    Mentions: OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.goodCosetMass

  26. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.PrivateStrategy.conditionalAgreement_from_slice line 397
  27. def OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.SurrogateFibers.shortcodeAcceptance line 464

    Source documentation

    Uniform shortcode sampling; neither nonzero-factor conditioning nor rank-one-matrix-uniform sampling is substituted for its two independent factors.

    def shortcodeAcceptance (f : (E →ₗ[F2] K) → C) : ℝ := by
    …
  28. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.SurrogateFibers.product_perturbation line 471
  29. theorem OAI.UniqueGamesTheorem.Decoder.SurrogateFibers.surrogate_acceptance_eq_fiber_average line 477